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ATC BEST PRACTICES: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPUTER-BASED SCORING 
Todd P. Hubbard 
I Abstract 
This paper explains how computer-based scoring of computer-generated scenarios in air traffic was designed and 
developed to meet the objectives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Radar Terminal Facility (RTF) 
instructors h m  the Air Traffic Division at the FAA Academy, other Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) from 
Miami and Chicago, and professional educators converged in September 2002 to design, develop, and implement a 
course that would enhance controller effectiveness by capturing controller best practices. These best practices were 
synthesized from a series of intensive air traffic control simulations in a fictional airspace. Progmamers from the FAA 
Academy worked with subject matter experts to design and develop an objective means by which these simulations 
could be graded. The result was a modified version of an Academy invented program called SIGNAL. The newly 
enhanced software met the team's expectations and looked to have future applications in initial air traffic controIler 
training. 'Ihe success of SIGNAL has also had an effect on all pretest-podtest measures for other groups within the 
Academy. 
ATC Best Practices: Assessing a Skill-Based Program 
During 2000, Jane Garvey, the Federal Aviation 
A-on (FAA) Admrmstrato . * r,wasfullyfocusedon 
the growing number of ~ n w a y  incursions. As a means to 
solve the problem, Garvey helped the Runway Safety 
Program Office draft 10 initiatives, which included an 
interestkg provision that required all education and training 
program to create the means to evaluate each program's 
effectiveness pederal Aviation Administration [FAA], 
2000). The 10 initiatives were disseminated throughout the 
FAA and soon captured the interest of training managers 
and statf specialists who were in the best positions to arrest 
the runway incursion problem. One group chartered to quell 
the growing number of operational deviations was the Air 
T M c  Team Enhancement (ATTE) Steering Committee. 
The group's mix of educators, air trdXc controllers, and air 
traftic managers focused their attention on team-building 
strategies as a means of allaying these operational 
deviations. 
By summer's end, members of the ATTE steering 
committee had been asked to determine the means by which 
the ATTE program could assess its effectiveness. This task 
was more a plea for an evaluation instrument than the 
invention of yet another process. The committee solicited 
help fiom the FAA Academy's Air Traflic Division at the 
Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, since the Academy instructors had experience 
with assessing air W c  trainkg programs (J. Cope, 
personal communication, July 8,2000). The Academy, in 
turn, solicited help fbm adult education professionals, 
training specialists, and academics from the University of 
Oklahoma. In October, Hubbard (2000) issued a report to 
the FAA Academy in which the current forms of assessment 
of the ATTE program were appraised. In summary, the 
report indicated that the program's effectiveness was only 
slightly assessed through its use of seW-repo* surveys. 
One could not directly attribute a reduction or gain in 
runway incursions to the information gained fiom ATTE 
workshops. Without a more definiug instrument with which 
to measure the program's efficacy, the merits ofthe program 
remained a question. As Hubbard (2000) suggested, the 
reason why the ATTE workshops lacked efficacy was 
because they were designed to separately sample cognitive, 
afktive, or psychomotor activity. Workshop objectives did 
not fuse the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains 
of learning. Since 2000, the ATTE program has addressed 
these issues. 
The requirement to measure the efkliveness of 
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education and training has been an ongoing initiative within 
the FAA and a special interest of the Superintendent of the 
FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. In 1999,200 1, and 2003 
the FAA Academy hosted the International Aviation 
Training Symposium (IATS) in Oklahoma City. Hundreds 
of civil aviation managers, trainers, and air traffic specialists 
h m  over 40 countries shared their experiences at each of 
the events, validating the FAA Administrator's belief that 
program assessment should be the chief interest of all 
training managers. Training evaluation and assessment were 
specifically targeted in the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University paper on Quality Mmgement in Aviation 
Training (Hisam, 1999), in the Intemational Civil Aviation 
Organization's TRAINAIR paper on Regional Training 
Planning: A Cooperative Approach to Meeting Shored 
Objectives (Fox, 2001), and m EUROCONTROL's paper on 
&Learning: the EUROCONTROL fiperience (Drain, 
2003). 
Still under the influence of international interest m 
training assessment and the FAA Administrator's direction 
through the Runway Safety Program Office, the 
Superintendent of the FAA Academy challenged his staff to 
create an assessment model that would measure knowledge 
and skill abilities before course start and again after the 
course was completed. At nearly the same time, Air Traffic 
Service Director (AAT-I), Bill Peacock, announced that he 
wanted the FAA Academy Air T-c Division to create an 
Air T d E c  Controller (ATC) Best Practices program, 
designed to capture best practices fiom highly skilled 
controllers and teach these same best practices to all other 
controllers. Taken together, the mandates issued by the FAA 
AQninistrator, the Air T d c  Service Director, and the 
FAA Academy Superintendent put pressure on the 
Academy's Air Traffic Division to explore all opportunities 
and means to measure knowledge-based and skill-based 
learning. 
The purpose of this paper is to expose and 
comment on the design, development, and implementation 
prouxm that the ATC Best Practices program staff 
employed to make this program a success. More 
specifically, this paper details the creation of a computer- 
based scoring system that proved to be the remedy for 
pretest-posttest assessment of skill-based learning and 
provided an objective means by which the Academy could 
isolate and measure best practices in Certified Professional 
Controllers (CPC). 
Program Design and Development Phase 
The technical approach for setting up the Best 
Practices program was guided, in part, by the FAA Academy 
Guidelines for the Development, Delivery, and Evaluation 
ofTraining (FAA Academy. March 1998). Modifications to 
the guidelines, to accommodate a more flexible 
development process, were presented and approved by Aii 
Traffic Division management and Mr. Peacock. 
Foundational objectives had been issued fiom headquarters 
in two documents: Performance Measure Results Task 1 and 
Critical Work Activity 1. Within the documents were nested 
five, broad objectives: (1) develop a tool to measure 
effectiveness and impact of technical training, (2) research, 
develop, and prototype a process for collecting information, 
(3) establish necessary baseline data, (4) establish 
improvement goals, and (5) manage to reach goals. 
Working in the regulatory milieu, managers at the 
FAA Academy discovered that the layers of requests for 
precise measures of eflkdiveness h m  various levels of 
supervision, pointed to the development of a unifying 
instrument. In the next few weeks, management would 
select a team, devise a strategy for rapid response, and begin 
the process of creating a means to measure effectiveness. 
Selecting fhe Team 
Responsibility for the program was given to Mike 
Momson, the supervisor for the Terminal Radar Training 
section (AMA-5 12). Morrison, in turn, put together a team 
of professionals that included FAA Academy air haEc 
controller instructors (Terminal Option), subject matter 
experts fiom the Chicago and Miami Terminal Radar 
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, training specialists 
h m  Washington's FAA Air Traffic Resome Management 
Program, and a contract instructional systems designer. The 
controllers fiom the tenninal control facilities at Chicago 
and Miami were handpicked by the president of the National 
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), John Carr. 
Background data were gathered that provided enough 
information to complete a task and skills analysis, devise a 
training proposal, and set up the framework for a training 
development plan. Periodic meetings were scheduled over 
the next seven months, to give the team members time to 
design the program, develop aprototype scenario for testing, 
test the scenario, and make modifications for linther testing. 
In addition, the FAA Academy provided computer 
programmers to support the building of a scoring 
management system within the radar simulators, to capture 
data during the scenario events. 
Dewbpbrg on z~~~tmmalt 
The team used a rapid prototyping technique to 
create the tools that would measure the effectiveness of 
technical traiuhg. Based on direction firom the program's 
founder and principal supporter, Mr. Peacock, the program 
had to measure the three ingredients of air traffic events: 
safety, expeditious control of aircraft, and efficient use of 
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airspace. Based on the time constraints imposed by FAA 
higher headquarters, the logical venue for the new program 
was the Radar Training Facility laboratory at the FAA 
Academy. The most logical and most accessible medium for 
the project was the Academy's radar simulator. 
, FAA Academy Radar Training Facility (RTF) 
imlmctors, along with the subject matter experts (SMEs) 
fiom Chicago and Miami, discussed how they would assess 
a controller's ability, while also capturing best practices. 
Human-based assessment presented too many reliability 
challenges. Tbe only viable non-human alternative of any 
note was an idea to program the simulator computer to score 
specific items. This solution, although created by humans, 
would not involve humans as observers or evaluators. 
Having selected the means by which controllers 
would be scored, the team set out to establish baseline data 
for controller capacity. As the team discovered, controller 
capacity had to be defined systematically. Controller 
capacity was simply defined as the sum of the aircraft 
landed, minus tie result of operational errors, procedural 
errors, and inaccurate phraseology. Operational errors are 
defined as "an occurrence attriiutable to an element of the 
air traflic system in which less than the applicable 
separation minima results between two or more aircraf€, or 
between an aircraft and terrain or obstacles" (Department of 
Transportation [DOT], 2002, p. 5-1). Five types of 
procedural error were tracked, they were transfer of 
communication errors (instructed to contact Tower before 
Final Approach Fix), intercept altitude errors (intercept the 
localizer above the glide slope), intercept angle errors 
(excessive angle), intercept point errors (aircraft intercepted 
the final approach inside the approach gate), and approach 
clearance altitude errors (aircraft not on a published route or 
segment of the approach being cleared for approach). 
Based on the advice of the SMEs h m  Miami and 
Chicago, the computer progmmmhg s W  and RTF 
instructors created an aggressive simulation of ATC Level 
12 traffic volume. The scenario was tested repeatedly by the 
RTF instructors, before being given to the ATC Level 12 
members of the team. Following numerous trials, the ATC 
Level 12 SMEs agreed that the scenario was equivalent to 
the traffic level they had intended. However, two items on 
the planning list sti l l  needed to be de&rmhed: (I) determine 
the duration of each scenario, and (2) determine the 100041 
capacity level of an ATC Level 12 controller. A& M e r  
trials the team agreed on a 30-minute session length. 
A 30-minute session time was chosen for three 
reasons: (1) 30 minutes provided enough time to measure 
safety, expediency, and efficiency at the 100% intensity 
level; (2) 30-minute sessions allowed the instructors to run 
JAAER,Spting2006 
more scenarios throughout a given training day; and (3) 
controllers working beyond peak performance begin to 
fBtigue at about 30 minutes, normally followed by increased 
operational errors and deviations, which would not be 
tolerated in a real situation. 
The team had defined controller capacity, but they 
had not manipulated controller capacity by subjecting 
controllers to air traffic intensity levels greater than and 
lesser than their peak capacity (1 00Y0 capacity level). A first 
step toward documenting changes in controller capacity was 
to establish the perfect solution; and the simulator's 
computer provided the means. However, a perfect solution 
had to be based on the parameters given to human 
participants and those parameters had not been fully 
expressed. This led to another period of extensive trials, 
which in the end resulted in the validation of a series of air 
traffic intensity levels. 
Establishing air traffic intensity levels for ATC 
Level 12 controllers proved to be difficult, because it was 
virtually impossible to account for all the variance. As the 
team began their trials, they set limits to the environment to 
help control variance. For example, all traffic would 
sequence through two points on the radar map, called posts, 
instead of four points on the map. This limited the scan 
pattern for new aircraft to just two areas. Further, 
intermediate altitude restrictions caused by airway corridors 
were eliminated. 'Ibis eliminated confusion when giving 
vectors and giving insttuctions for descent into the radar 
pattern. All of the aircraft were sequenced to a single 
runway, as opposed to a multiple-runway operation. To help 
each controller focus on arriving traflic, all d-s were 
eliminated. To ensure that all controllers would have an 
equal chance of succeeding, the team created a lesson that 
explained the airspace and created extra scenarios to help 
controllers practice the new procedures before being graded. 
Even the radio calls h m  the aircraft were 
controlled. Pseudo pilots are commonly used to give the air 
traffic controller students practice communicating with 
pilots. These pseudo pilots receive training before assisting 
in the radar lab, but they can have off-peak-performance 
days. This problem with consistency was alleviated by pre- 
selecting pilots and then using the same pilots for all trials. 
Having reduced the variance in the radar 
environment of the lab, the team refined their definition of 
the 1000/0 solution. A scenario was considered to be a 1 W h  
solution if the intensity level of air traffic equaled the 
controller's capcity to safely control those airct;lft for 30 
minutes. This meant that during the 30-minute scenario, the 
controller could not commit any errors. Further, the 
controller had to sequence the maximum number aircraft to 
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the outer marker and had to efficiently use the airspace. The 
first 100% solution was set by the SMEs from Miami and 
Chicago. Confidence for their 10WA solution was based on 
trials at the 1 1W intensity level. 
Determining any degree of difficulty above the 
100% level was made possible by first establishing 
normative behavior among ATC Level 12 controllers. Over 
a period of weeks, the Miami and Chicago consulting 
controllers had established a consistent pattern of controller 
behavior at their peak output level; which prompted the 
team to make a judgment about this level of consistency. 
However, the team was reluctant to generalize the behavior 
to all ATC Level 12 controllers; nonetheless, they predicted 
similar outcomes in future trials. 
As a precaution, the team created a control for their 
expexhents. The results of the computer-generated 
controlled trial are shown in Table 1. 
The computer-based controlled trial excited interest 
in a computer-based scoring and data-gathering instrument. 
During the next two months the programmers modified the 
~cademy's imulator support software program (SIGNAL), 
allowing the team to observe a perfect simulator session 
without the influence of a pseudo pilot or an air traffic 
controller. After several trials, the programming was 
perfkcted to the point that the team was w i l l i i  to use 
SIGNAL as the new computer-based scoring device. 
Objective data, based on ratio scale accuracy, would 
eliminate human error and would increase the inbmd and 
external reliability of the program. 
The three parameters that were measured by the 
computer were safety, expediency, and efficiency. The 
safety component of the computer score measured 
operational errors. Operational errors were measured by 
calculations of IFR separation loss, using a high, moderate, 
and low scale that had been derived from the FAA Order 
7210.56C (dated August 15, 2002), Air T r m c  Quality 
Assurunce. The calculation tables fomd in Chapter 6 
(Severi' Index) of that order were used to assess points for 
loss of standard separation and loss of separation based on 
wake turbulence criteria The sum of the points was used to 
calculate the severity of the error. 
The computer also kept track of how many aircraft 
crossed the outer marker inbound for a final landing, which 
the team viewed as a measure of expediency. The latitude- 
longitude of the outer marker in relation to the position of 
each aimaft on final approach was used to determine when 
the aircraft was counted as having landed. If the aircraft 
crossed the outer marker, the computer would tally another 
landing, since the scenario did not involve 
coordination between the Tower controller and the Final 
Table 1. Computer-generated Score (prototypical phase) 
controller. 
Efficient airspace control was determined by taking 
the average separation between aircraft on final 
approach--starting when an aircraft turned on to final and 
ending when the air& crossed the outer marker. All 
average and excess mileage distances were based on nose to 
tail separation between aircraft on W. All separation 
distances that exceeded the minimum required, were 
summed as total excess mileage. Low mileages at the end of 
a 30-minute session indicated more efficient control of the 
airspace. 
On a computer monitor, positioned at an observing 
station used by instructors at the back of the simulation 
room, instructors could view, in real time, how each 
participant was doing in relation to safety, expediency, and 
efficiency. Each package consisted of a number of sheets of 
data, starting with a cover sheet that depicted total aircraft 
landed and the safety score, separated by type of error. 
Phraseology errors were also depicted on the cover sheet, 
and were the only subjective component of the score. The 
next few pages showed the raw data breakout of all the 
separation errors. This allowed each instructor to fisther 
analyze the reason for each error. An event listing that 
recorded event time, event name, aircraft identification, 
aircraft type, and spatial data immediately followed the 
error-scoring sheets. Average and total excess mileage 
sbtktics were shown on the last page of the package. 
The control mechanism having been set and having 
implemented a computer-based scoring system, the team 
was in a position to test their prediction about ATC Level 12 
controller behavior. To testtheiipredictionthe team devised 
a plan to validate the existing 1W/o capacity level and to 
reinforce that validation with comparable testing of 
A i d  
Landed 
21 
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High I Mod. I Low 
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Procedurai 
Enms 
0 
Standard Excess 
Mileage 
8.77 
Total Score 
32 1 
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controllers fi-om ATC Levels 8-12 facilities. The first step 
toward standardization of behavior required the team to find 
an average score for each of the three categories. Very 
quickly, within the first 30 days of having a computer 
scoring system, the Miami and Chicago controllers set 
benchmark scores for the three parameters. 
The second step toward standardhtion of behavior 
required the team to verify the average scores. They elected 
to incrementally increase the intensity level of the scenario 
problem, in hopes that they could measure the decline of 
controller capacity. This procedure was based on 
conclusions derived by Yerkes and Dodson id their study of 
arousal and task complexity. Their upside down U-shaped 
curve indicated that the quality of performance declined as 
the arousal state exceeded peak perfonnance (Telfer & 
Biggs, 1988). The shape of the curve indicated that the 
decline was steady. Having been satisfied earlier by the 
incredible consistency of control of this initial group of 
participants, the team q m & d y  pushed these same 
controllers their peak, to measure the difference 
between 1Wh capacity and some predicted lesser capacity 
at traffic volumes higher than the standard. In similar 
fashion to Yerkes and Dodson, it was reasoned that as the 
intensity level of traffic was increased, the number of errors 
would also increase. Further, the team expected to see a 
breakdown in efficiency. Since safety, efficiency, and 
expediency translated to numerical scores, it was easy to 
measure incremental differences in capacity. Therefore, it 
was quite possible to set a declination scale of behavior that 
exceeded the 100% limit. Having completed the second step 
toward standardization of behavior, the team began a new 
course of testing. 
Given the low number of participants in the initial 
test of the 1 W h  solution, the team expanded the 
standardization process to groups of instructors containing 
ATC Level 12 controllers, as well as controllers fi-om air 
W 5 c  facilities with less intense W 5 c  volume. The 
computer- trial scores and the Miami-Chicago 
scores presented the team with a starting point for further 
testing. Table 2 shows the mean scores for all the categories 
at the 1 W?' intensity level, using 24 participants. Range of 
scores was 1 00-28 1, compared to the range of 200-28 1 for 
the Miami-Chicago trials. 
Given the data b m  the additional trials, it was 
surmised that the range of combined scores and the averages 
for efficient and expeditious control were more telling 
components of standard perfonnance. By comparing the 
Miami-Chicago results with these additional trials, the team 
developed a sense of what might happen in the first course 
conduct. That hypothesis suggested that at the 1 W ?  level, 
one could anticipate averages at 19 aircraft (expeditious), 
14.2 miles (efficiency), and 208 points (combined score). 
Testing was also performed at reduced intensity 
levels, such as 75%, 880%, and 90% (see Table 3). These 
alternative scenarios were the product of the completed 
Miami-Chicago tests and were validated by repeated trials 
Table 2. Prototypical Phase Data, 1 W ?  intensity level (n=24) 
by RTF instructors at the Academy(75%: n=37; 80%: n=34; 
90%: n=28). Members of the team commonly accepted that 
certified controllers who were not familiar with the airspace 
suppo&g these scenarios would not perform well until 
becoming more familiar with the environment. Therefore, 
during the remaining trials and in the first course conduct, 
participants would spend at least 12 hours building speed 
and familiarization before nmning the final scenario at the 
100% level. The intewening levels of intensity, with 
established practice time at each level, provided the team 
with a means to measure improvemenr thus meeting the 
fourth objective of the Administrator's list. 
JAAER, Spring 2006 
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Total 
Score 
1 84 
-- 
Page 35 
Miami-Chicago Trials 
19.5 I I I I I 13.8 1 232 
Average 
Aircraft 
Landed 
(expeditions) 
18.7 
Average 
Procedural 
Emrs 
Errors 
1.1 
Average 
Standard 
Excess 
Mileage 
(emciency) 
14.57 
Average 
Operational Emrs 
(safety) 
High Mod. 
2.1 
Low 
1 
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Table 3. Prototypical Phase Data, Varied Intensity Levels (averaged data) 
Periodically throughout the baseline data collection 
process the team refined the scenarios and programmed 
adjustments into the computational grading performed by 
the computer. The refinements and adjustments influenced 
the internal validity of the baseline scores to the extent that 
a separate trial was conducted in February, just before the 
first ATC Level 12 first course conduct (also referred to as 
operational tryout). Data were collected during this separate 
trial. These new data were compared to the initial baseline 
data and both sets of values were used as referents for the 
Intensity 
Level 
75% 
80% 
90% 
first ATC Level 12 operational tryout data 
Pretest-Posttest Assessment 
Four individuals were chosen to participant in the 
pretest-posttest trial. Each participant completed the 100% 
pretest scenario, practiced at the 75%, 80% and 90% levels 
for two days, and then completed the 1W/o posttest 
scenario. The same intermediate intensity level scenarios 
were used for each participant. The data were recorded and 
adyzed (Tables 4 & 5). 
Table 4. Pretest Assessment, Preliminary Tryout I ~ircraff ( ~perational~rmrs I ROC. ( 1 ~ d a i  
Aimaft 
Landed 
(expeditious) 
16.05 
17.70 
17.89 
Note: One of the participants did not complete the pretest. 
Operational Errors 
(safety) 
19 
19 
17 
Table 5. Posttest Assessment, Preliminary Tryout 
Opemtional Errors I Total 
High 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the data were part of a preliminary tryout. 
hoc. 
Errors 
1.05 
1.67 
1.57 
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Mod. 
1 
1.05 
1.42 
High 
Standard 
Excess 
Mileage 
(efficiency) 
12.58 
14.12 
13.48 
Low 
-27 
.35 
.28 
Errors 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
Score 
178 
1 99 
191 
Moderate 
1 
6 
6 
Stand Excess 
15.9 
1737 
16.7 
Low 
0 
2 
1 
Score 
220 
110 
63 
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The following comparison of total scores indicates pretest-posttest alignment by individual. 
Participant 1 220128 1 
Participant 2 631130 
Participant 3 110/190 
Participant 4 *I263 
* indicates the absence of a pretest 
The intervening period between the pretest and 
posttest was set at two days. Rather than being set by some 
scientific means, the intervening time of two days was 
chosen for purely administrative reasons, to help cut the cost 
of the program. If the course were contained within three 
days, each participant could travel on Mond&y and Friday, 
avoiding having to pay per diem for travel over a weekend. 
During the three days of the course the instructors planned 
to run an initial assessment (pretest) of controller skill at the 
1W/o level, introduce best practices to CPCs, allow time to 
integrate the new skills, and then measure the improvement 
on a final skill test (posttest). 
From the data collected duringthe operational frials 
and operational tryout, it appeared that the team had met the 
Administrator's first objective: develop a tool to measure 
eflectiveness and impact of technical training. 
Lesson Development Phase 
Maaging for Change 
During the time that the air traffic controllers on 
the team were establishing the baseline data for the program, 
other members on the team were creating the means to pass 
on best practices to the participants who would complete the 
program after the operational tryouts. The program was 
planned for a one-hour introduction (administrative details), 
followed by a 1W/o intensity level scenario (performed by 
each participant), followed by a three-hour block where best 
practices were discussed. During the three-hour block, the 
instructor used an active 100% scenario to illustrate when 
best practices should be employed. After the instructional 
period, the participants were given a number of practice 
sessions at the 75%, 80% and 90% intensity levels. AAer 
each 30-minute session, each participant was debriefed for 
30 minutes. Following the debriefing of the scenario, each 
participant completed another practice session at the same 
or higher intensity level. This process continued for four 
hours on day one and eight hours on day two. On the third 
day the participants practiced at the 1 W h  intensity level 
were given a 30-minute rest, and then were given the final, 
100% intensity level scenario. Following the posttest, the 
scores were tallied and the best performer was announced. 
At the end of the program, each participant was given some 
time to critique the design and offer suggestions for 
improvement, to include suggesting additional best 
practices. 
The initial set of best practices had been derived 
fiom observations of the expert controllers hm Chicago 
and Miami terminal approach facilities. Since these experts 
were selected fiom all terminal option controllers, the team 
was reasonably sure that these individuals would be capable 
of isolating those techniques that made them better 
controllers, in terms of expeditious, safe, and efficient 
control of aircraft. Most of the initial best practices were 
variations of the controller's standard tools for separation: 
vectors, sequencing, and speed control. A list of these 
practices formed the basis for the scenario debriefing sheet 
(see Appendix, Scenario Debriefing Sheet, for a cqmplete 
list of best practices). 
As the team discussed how the program would 
evolve, they came up with a solution for long-term growth 
that would ensure continued success. The team envisioned 
using the top performers as adjunct instructors for future 
iterations of the best practices program. In this way, the 
program would be staffed by a collection of the best 
controllers, who would in turn pass on their achievements to 
the rest of the controller force. The team felt that this 
approach would fulfill the wishes of AAT-1 and might 
influence the controller population in such a way that air 
traffic control would be safer, more efficient, or more 
expeditious and it would meet the Administrator's fifth 
evaluation objective: manage to reach goals. 
The team became concerned about the singular 
focus on ATC Level 12 facilities and the omission of input 
h m  levels of traffic below the ATC 12 level. To manage 
the differences between ATC Levels, the best practices 
design and development team planned to establish new 
baselines for each level. The process for establishing the 
baseline would be largely the same as was used in the 
prototype program. However, each baseline would be 
supported by scenarios that sampled the kind of traffic 
volume and the appropriate complexity level indicative of 
any specific ATC Level. As in the ATC Level 12 course, the 
top performers for each ATC Level course would be asked 
to join the adjunct staff for future classes of controllers. 
Overcoming Acceptable Risks 
There were a number of issues that the team 
worked through, but did not fully resolve during the design 
and development process. One threat to internal validity was 
the lack of a quan-le set of behaviors that would define 
the average certified professional controller. The team had 
reviewed the knowledge and performance requirements for 
a terminal option, certified controller (Ammeman, 
Fairhurst, Hostetler, & Jones, 1989; Broach & Manning, 
1997), but the literature review did not present the means to 
capture performance. The team subsequently chose to 
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sample knowledge, attitude, and performance 
simultaneously during the scenario by using the computer- 
based scoring system. The data set the boundaries for high 
and low performance. 
Another known risk to the project was the pretest- 
posttest assessment strategy. It is commonly reported that a 
* pretest can have an affect on the posttest, depending on the 
time interval between the tests (Wiersma, 2000). The time 
interval between tests was at least 12 hours, which in itself 
would suggest that the pretest would influence the posttest; 
but that was not the case in the best practices program. 
During the 12-hour interval each participant performed at 
least five other scenarios. The scenarios were based on the 
same airspace, but the amount of traffic and the rate of 
tratiic were different for each scenario. Had the scenarios 
been similar, one would hazard a guess that the posttest was 
compromised. However, what the team found during the 
baseline trials and the operational tryouts was that the 
inte~ening sessions seemed to diminish the memory of the 
pretest. 
The problem of learning regression did occur in 
nearly all the participants. Certified controllers fiom several 
terminal option facilities demonshated a pronounced 
decrease in controller effectiveness after taking the pretest. 
The 100Y0 intensity pretest shocked the participants to the 
degree that when given scenarios at 75% and 80% of peak 
intensity, the controllers did poorly. Compare the data in 
Table 7 with the data in Table 6. Notice that the 
effectiveness scores (air& landed) between the pretest and 
the intermediate intensity level scenarios has decreased. The 
safety (error rate) scores also showed an overall decrease 
Srom the pretest. 
Table 6. ATC Level 12 First Course Conduct Pretest-Posttest Comparison 
High I Moderate I Low 
Table 7. ATC Level 12 First Course Conduct (Intermediate intensity levels) I ATC12Op I Efficiency I EfExtiveness I K e t y  I Trials I 
Aircraft 
I Tryout I (excess ( (airclaftlanded) I (numberof I I 
Excess Score I qmtional E m  
1 
Errors 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person3 
Person4 
Person1 
Person2 
Person 3 
Person4 
Pretest 
Total Proc. 
Mileage 
Stand 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 
2 
19 
16 
19 
20 
1 
4 
2 
2 
Posttest 
12.15 
12.2 
12.89 
9.94 
250 
86 
140 
200 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
19 
18 
19 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15.08 
12.6 
14.72 
8.98 
300 
260 
206 
240 
8
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 15, No. 3 [2006], Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol15/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2006.1487
Computer-Based Scoring 
Discussion 
In a regulated air traffic environment, new 
processes and procedures are often challenged by those who 
believe that nothing has changed or by those who lack 
imagination. During the Best Practices project, new 
instructional development processes were challenged, but 
the team countered with an imagined process that provided 
for simultaneous design and development. All of the team 
members were allowed to engage fkeely. Management kept 
the group centered by reminding everyone of the objectives, 
but management did not dictate how each person would 
perceive the project, nor did they limit each person's 
involvement. The members of the team that perceived 
intuitively felt the flow of the project and allowed the 
project to tulk back. Those team members that perceived 
more concretely followed the established procedures set by 
regulation or precedent. 
What had not been intentionally thought out before 
the project began was how people would relate to each 
other. However, h m  a crew resource management point of 
view, persons @valved in the development of this project 
behaved in ways that exemplified the very best in effective 
communication, decision-making, risk management, 
workload management, and situational awareness. If any 
other group would attempt this project, they should select 
persons who already function well on teams. Perhaps a brief 
description of the team members would help illustrate this 
point. 
m e  People 
Objectives laid down by Mr. Peacock provided a 
central focus for the team. Having thus established the 
broader boundaries of the project, each team member 
concentrated on exploiting his or her own gifts. It is more 
fitting to describe personal contriiutions as gifts than to call 
themskills,atleastinthiscase;because~11~onthe~ 
did not solely fimction h m  their acknowledged skill set, 
but rather included unheralded skills that became visible as 
they were needed. 
The manager of the project could be descn'bed as 
a gifted negotiator and coach. He used his gifts to help each 
team member see where he or she could contribute to the 
end goal. He also knew how to preserve the best fkom each 
member and showed each member how he or she could knit 
his or her effort into the fabric of the final product. The RTF 
bstructors selected for this project demonstrated great self- 
control. Instead of fighting for control, each instructor 
channeled his or her energy into perfecting the scenario 
designs. This was padcularly evident when the ATC Level 
12 controllers from Miami and Chicago visited the 
Academy. Any personal bravado, heard during the trial 
period, was mitigated by over-powering professionalism. 
In a project that @ereti the art of the air t d E c  
controller, one might think that anyone without those 
credentials would be overlooked or overwhelmed by those 
having the skill. However, this was not the case. Credit for 
the b i o n  of skills should be given to the manager of the 
team. He extended the effectiveness of the team by letting 
parts of the team work independently, convening the whole 
group to discuss new features in the design and development 
of the project. 
Rapid Prototyping 
Rapid prototyping proved to be a very useful 
process during the development of this project. It allowed 
sub-groups to work independently on specific elements of 
the design. It also invited experts to engage and disengage 
for finite periods of time, thus h i n g  them to teach in the 
classroom or to work on other projects after their job within 
the project was completed. Most importantly, it allowed the 
team to shift directions when parts of the design did not 
work well. 
Objective Scoring 
Perhaps the most beneficial outcome ofthe project 
was the creation of an objective scoring system for the air 
t d E c  control simulator. SIGNAL software provided the 
instructors a common point of reference for assessing safety, 
efficiency, and expediency. At the writing of this paper, the 
Academy is validating an enhauced version of SIGNAL to 
assess students in the initial air traffic control course. 
Historical scoring routines for air traffic control lab 
sessions had relied on the experience and judgment of the 
instructor in assessing student behavior. To put it simply, 
hard graders graded hard and easy graders graded easy. The 
dichotomy in grading practices among instructors left the 
students at a disadvantage. Remedies for the perceived or 
real diffkm~ce in grading standards had been attempted over 
the years, but those efforts had not always been successll. 
With the advent of Air Traffic Controller Best F'ractices, 
management fmally found an objective means by which 
students or CPCs could be graded. 
R e t e s t - P ~ A s s ~  
The computerized grading scheme that the 
programmers had created for Best Practices had a 
prospective effect on the initial air traflic controller training, 
while also providing a real time solution for the assessment 
of changes in learning during project development. Pretest- 
posttest schemes have, for decades, been successfblly 
applied to assess a change in knowledge during air t d E c  
control training. The interval scale data gained h m  the 
paper and pencil tests provided a precise measure of 
learning of all the course objectives. 
Paper and pencil testing has worked well for 
knowledge-based learning, but has not proven e£fective in 
assessing a change in skilled performance, particularly skills 
that require the person to operate on and respond to a 
machine. Perhaps the reason why skill-based learning has 
resisted the pretest-posttest assessment routine, is because 
no one expects a person to have any pre-course skill. Why 
measure pre-course performance if the reason for the course 
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is to teach the skill? Paper and pencil testing is also the 
wrong medium for the assessment of controller skill. 
Computer scoring, such as that accomplished by 
SIGNAL during Best Practices, is the remedy for skill- 
based assessment, or at least is a great start. Whereas 
pretest-posttest measures of skill were inadequate before 
Best Practices, they have since become adequate and 
relevant. Perhaps that success is partly due to the ratio scale 
data now available with SIGNAL, which by comparison 
diminishes the value of interval scale data obtained through 
the paper and pencil means. That success is also due in part 
to the context in which SIGNAL was used. The persons 
being scored in the validated Best Practices course were 
going to be fully qualified controllers who worked at ATC 
Level 12 facilities. They would be persons with a great deal 
of selfesteem and a great deal of proven talent in their skU. 
Had the scoring been any less objective--say with Academy 
RTF instructors-the participants would have cried foul and 
the whole program would have dissolved under the weight 
of bad press. One must keep in mind that these participants 
were also bargaining unit members. Therefore, it was 
imperative that the scoring be objective. However, this type 
of scoring has limited potential if used elsewhere for air 
t d i c  controller training. This is precisely why the 
Academy is undergoing a validation of an enhanced version 
of the original idea. 
Before leaving this subject, it is useful to note that 
computer scoring does not diminish the need for subjective 
intervention by expert air traffic controllers. This issue was 
raised during the Bart Practices trials. If a controller 
intentionally reduces the separation between aircraft on final 
to some distauce below that requid by FAA Order 
71 10.65, he or she is in violation of the Order and can be 
sanctioned for the safety error-in a real world situation. 
However, this apparmtly unsafe act is not always unsafe, 
even though it is m violation of the Order. It is a matter of 
control. Just as there are those who believe that a little 
compression (2.7 miles instead of 3 miles) cannot hurt if the 
situation on final aprwoach was controlled, there are others 
who see no gray in the Order. 'Ihis point has been so highly 
contended over the years that the FAA has published 
memoranda that allow some facilities to run aircraft closer 
than the established minimums. 
The computer scoring system can measure 
distances between aircraft, but that system lacks the power 
to understand why or how. Expert controllers can determine 
why and how. Any grading system in the fbture will need 
to incorporate the human element. 
Effecls of Learning Regression 
Computer scoring of each scenario allowed the 
teamtotrackshiftsinleamin&Forexample,theteammted 
that most of the l l l y  qualified controllers would perform 
worse on their first, 100% intensity level scenario. Using 
321 points as the perfect computer score, the team saw 
scores in the 100s on the first, 100% scenario. It was 
common for these same individuals to remain in the 100s 
even when given scenarios at the 75% and 85% levels. 
However, after six or so additional scenarios these same 
participants began to show some improvement. By the end 
of the trial period, these controllers routinely scored in the 
mid to high 200s. 
Based on the evidence of dozens of trials with 
Academy instructors, the Best Practices developers believed 
that any one person's attitude toward the Best Practices 
scenarios would be positive and welcoming. As a whole, the 
projected view was that all or most of the fimve participants 
would have a similar reaction to the training as did the 
Academy instructors. A representative fiom Chicago 
terminal radar control forecasted that ATC Level 12 
controllers would have little trouble adapting to the 
scenarios and would do very well, perhaps even becoming 
bored at times. By the end of the first course conduct, 
thoughts that the project would improve controller skills, 
while giving a boost to the ego of each participant, were 
h t r a t e d  by an unforeseen reaction to perceived failure. 
No one on the Best Practices team was prepared 
for tbe ' d o n s  of the fully d e d  ATC Level 12 
controllers. The scores on the first 1 W/o scenario (pretest) 
were 250, 86, 140, and 200. Scores in the 200s were not 
exceptional, but they were well within the range anticipated 
by the team. Scores below 200 were not new; but the team 
had anticipated a better showing, even for the pretest 
scenario. The reader will recall that the range of scores for 
the Miami-Chicago trials was 200-28 1, while the range for 
otherparticipantsduringthetrialperiodwas 100-281. 
Perhaps the most shocked were the team 
representatives fiom Miami and Chicago. They were 
profoundly surprised by the participants' failure to readily 
adapt to new airspace. SMEs h m  Chicago and Miami had 
insisted that ATC Level 12 controllers could control a i d  
anywhere, any time. The team now knows that this 
announcement might have been made to identify ATC Level 
12 controllers as superior to o k  controllers. However, this 
notion was not supported by the first group of participants. 
The participants were equally surprised by the results of 
their efforts. Perhaps they too had the same impression as 
the Miami and Chicago controllers. 
Surprise led to selfdoubt for some. On repeated 
trials, the poorer performers stumbled on the less intense 
scenarios. By the end of day two of the course, one 
participant was starting to show improvement, another was 
maintaining an average to good score on all trials, a third 
participant was trapped in continual poor performance, and 
the fourth participant was getting consistently better on each 
trial. Since controllers are largely egoQiven, the effect of 
having an ace performer and a poor performer was estemn- 
building to the good p e r f o m  while devastating to the poor 
performer. Going into the third and final day of the course, 
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the participants started to vocalize their feelings. One person 
said that he was embarrassed by his performance and could 
not believe he was doing so poorly. Another person was so 
embarrassed that he apologized to the instructors of the 
course and his fellow participants, even during the final 
critique. 
F l n a l R ~  
The pre and post scores, when grouped together, 
indicated that the course was a success (2501300, 861260, 
1401206, 2001240). The person with the large 
excursion-hm 86 on the first 1 W/o scenario to 260 on the 
final 1000h scenario-showed the most improvement, which 
would not have been predicted by the poor showing during 
the intervening trials. His scores remained low up to the last 
few trials. It was clear that this person had some 
psychomotor breaktbrough moment, where everything 
became clear. The individual starting with 200 and ending 
with 240 had performed consistently throughout the three 
days. Surprisingly, this individual had the lowest excess 
mileage score (8.98 miles). He landed as many aircraft as 
the person scoripg 300, but he lost points with procedural 
errors. The highest scoring individual secured his top score 
by not making any errors, but bad the most excess mileage 
of the group (1 5.08 miles). 
ATC Best Practices was designed to enhance air 
traffic controller skills. The program measured three 
categories: safety, efficiency, and expediency. Safety scores 
improved when the controller reduced the number of errors 
per session. Expediency scores improved when the 
controller landed more aircraft during a session. And finally, 
I [ High 1 Moderate 1 Low I Errors 
Table 8. ATC Level 12 Outcomes 
efficiency scores improved when the controller reduced the 
excess mileage between aircraft on final approach for 
landing. 
In most of the cases, the participants did not show 
marked improvement in all three categories. Table 8 shows 
what improved and what did not improve. The expediency 
scores, when comparing pretest and posttest results by 
individual, showed one gain, two losses, and one even set of 
scores. The safety scores showed a marked change; whereas 
all participants made moderate or low operational errors in 
the pretest, none of the participants made operational errors 
on the posttest. Efficiency of air trafiic control h m  pretest 
to posttest for these individuals was counter-intuitive. One 
might think that there is a link between number of aircraft 
landed, excessive mileage, and total score, if operational 
errors were the same for all participants. For example, if a 
person were to land 20 aircraft during a 30-minute session, 
it might seem logical that high effectiveness scores would be 
associated with low excess mileage scores. This is not a 
proper analysis of these scores. On three posttest scores 
individuals landed 19 aircraft. None of the three had any 
operational errors. However, the excess mileage among the 
three was very different (1911 5.08, 19112.6,1918.98). If we 
compare these data with &a1 scores, we see how 
troublesome it would be to predict a final result if the 
prediction were based on aircraft landed and excess mileage 
(1911 5.081300, 19112.6/260, 1918.981240). Based on the 
data, it seems that procedural errors made the diEmmce 
between a great score and an average score. 
-1 Excess Proc. Aircraft Operational Errors 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
Person 4 
Pretest 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
Person 4 
JAAER Spring 2006 
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250 
86 
140 
1 
4 
2 
0 
2 
3 
0 
0 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
Air traffic controllers are highly competitive and 
take every opportuuity to establish themselves as the best, in 
everything. From sizes of houses, to prices of cars, to 
longest period without an operational error or deviation, to 
+ handling the most traffic at an ATC Level 12 facility, 
controllers want to be the best. Despii each person's desire 
to be the best, the FAA has not had an objective means by 
which it could measure the best. ATC Best Practices was 
developed to do two things: (1) capture best practices fiom 
among air t dEc  controllers, and (2) enhance controller 
skills by helping each person use these best practices to 
improve their ability. Finding a means to measure the best 
occupied the time of more than a dozen individuals over the 
course of a year. When they finished, they had a decisive 
tool to measure air traflic control and they had a means by 
which they could capture best practices fiom among the 
FAA's best controllers. 
Notwithstanding the need to meet Mr. Peaaxk's 
objectives for the program, it was also important to build a 
program that satisfied the five objectives of the 
Administrator's policy on training. Without any formula or 
other project to copy, the A K  Best Practices team created 
their own prototype, tested the prototype, validated the 
prototype, and used it to conduct their first course. They not 
only created the means to measure controller performance, 
they developed a strategy to capture best practices and use 
those best practices to enhance the rest of the controller 
force. 
Despite the huge successes, there were casualties. 
The team had overlooked the effects of competition on fully 
certified, well experienced, controllers. To be fair, the team 
had not overlooked the effect of competition--that 
controllers thrived on it, but it had not included in that 
analysis any discussion of what would happen if a controller 
did poorly and reacted emotionally to that poor 
performance. While meeting all of the other goals and 
objectives, the team had ruled out any notion that controllers 
would expose a thin skin. 
On the lid day of the first course, one of the ATC 
Level12 controllers apologized for his poor performance. He 
publicly announced hi feelings to his fellow participants, 
the instructors of the course, and the controller-~hers.  
His apology was emotional, suggesting that he had been 
emotionally wounded. Several days after the participants 
had returned to their facilities, this same person e-mailed the 
instructors and apologized again. What had not been a 
prominent factor dwing the ht course conduct had 
suddenly become a factor as the team analyzed course 
outcomes. 
hLs 42 
There are a number of recommendations for those 
wishing to assess best practices among air traffic controllers. 
First, it is important that each ATC facility level have its 
own bestpractices program. What works for ATC Level 12 
might not work for ATC Levels below 12. Secondly, since 
there are differences between controllers fiom different 
ATC Level 12 fac ies ,  more trials should be nm on 
persons h m  more diverse ATC Level 12 facilities. With 
only three field controllers, one h m  Miami and two from 
Chicago, it was easy to tailor the course toward the 
influences of those two areas of control. Had the team 
expanded their focus beyond these two areas, they might 
have prepared a more representative scenario for a broader 
assortment of ATC Level 12 participants. Thirdly, it might 
have been a good idea to make more time for discussions 
about best practices. Time had been allotted for a brief 
discussion of best practices on the first day and some more 
time had been allotted for a brief discussion on the last day. 
However, this might not be enough time to capture tips to 
enhance controller eWveness. 
Lastly, any future effort in this area should address 
the effect of failure in a simulated environment. Persons are 
affected by Eailure m difkmt ways. Some persons do not 
see any difference between simulation and reality. Others 
value the simulator and the real world equally. The FAA 
will need to evaluate its stand on this issue. Is the Academy 
that right place to call into question a person's a b i i ,  
especially when that person's abiity has been dully 
certified? There are mechanisms for this type of evaluation 
at the facility. The FAA Academy is not wing to decertify 
a controller, based on his or her performance in this course. 
Instead, the Academy wishes to enhance a controller's 
ability. If a controller's ability is not enhanced by this 
course, the course manager should be finding out why. 
As is often irue, too few studies have been done in 
this area Computer scoring of radar control problems is 
relatively new at the FAA Academy and much more data 
needs to be collected before the instrument is perfected. 
Samplesizeduringthefirstcourse~ductwastoodto 
derive accurate results, despite the rigorous procedures used 
to establish a standard. More candidates will be needed 
before the results provide meaningful input. 
Every effort is being made to further the research 
m computer-generated scoring at the Academy. It is clear 
that skill-based assessment can be adequately measured by 
objective grading practices such as SIGNAL, but there will 
always be a place for the subjective opinions of experienced 
controllers. 
At the writing of this report on Best Practices the 
FAA staffers in Washington are planning to revive the 
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program and complete studies to include facilities with personal communication, June 14,2005). 
traffic counts below the ATC Level 12 level (M. Morrison, 
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Appendix 
ATC Best Practices Scenario Debriefing Sheet 
. Scenario (circle one): 75% 80% 90% 1000/0 
Vectoring 
I Shotgun to base 6om NE gate Time Heading Flow to airport fix for downwind fiom NE gate Flow to airport fix for downwind fiom NW gate Fly over fix to left downwind (Runway 28) Consistent downwind ground track Double downwind Vector from NE flow to NW flow Dual downwind 
ueoeing 
NE flow to downwind with observable spacing pattern 
NW flow to downwind with observable spacing pattern 
~r6nt-loading at beginning of push 
Builds gaps for wake turbulence 
Builds gaps for -65 spacing requirements 
Consistent turns to base and final Base turn mileage 
Straight-in sequence control Heading off localizer See speed control. 
Scan pattern (area, sweep, hub and spoke) 
Tie points 
Control 
Routinely slows aimaft at NE gate Time 
Routinely slows aircraft at NW gate 250kts 2lOkts Time 
Routinely slows aircraft on downwind 250kts 2lOkts 1Wkts 170kts 
Other 
8 Routinely slows aircraft on final 210kts 190kts 170kts Other Slows individual aircraft as the need arises A/C ID Position 
Time 0 Straight-in speed control Reduce to kts Increase to kts 
Priority of Duties 0 Established a recognizable pattern of control between gates, downwind, 
base turn, and final 
Took early control of aircraft at N W gate to manage flow 
Took early control of aircraft at NE gate to manage flow 
Concentrated on base tums at a designated mileage Mileage 
Concentrated on consistent downwind ground track 
Concentrated on speed control at the gate or certain points 
Errors Aircraft Landed Total Score 
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